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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3230 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 OLUFEMI ADIGUN, 
                                     Appellant  
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-11-cr-00151-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 26, 2015 
____________________________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
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______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Olufemi Adigun (“Appellant”) appeals the District Court’s judgment of conviction 
on conspiracy, fraud, unlawful monetary transactions and money laundering charges.  
Appellant argues that the Government improperly struck the sole potential African-
American juror on the basis of her race and gender in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   We hold that the District Court properly applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986) and correctly determined that the Government’s peremptory strike did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.  We will affirm.1  
I.  Factual and Procedural History 
 Appellant was indicted for counts of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, 
money laundering, and related charges in connection with a complex fraud and money 
laundering scheme.  After an initial mistrial, Appellant was re-tried and convicted on 
several counts.  
 During jury selection at the second trial, the Government exercised a peremptory 
strike to exclude an African-American woman as a potential alternate juror.  Appellant 
raised a Batson challenge, arguing that the strike was racially motivated.  In response, the 
                                                          
 *This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Government explained they had eliminated the juror because: (1) she was a state 
employee, and the Government’s experience was that state employees had a “liberal 
standpoint;” (2) she had only recently moved to Harrisburg, the trial venue; and (3) she 
was a relatively uneducated typist.  App. 117–18.  The Government later added that the 
juror was “also a woman,” and they were “looking for male juror[s] [who] tend to be 
stronger leaders in the jury room.”  App. 119. 
 Appellant moved for a mistrial and to re-panel the jury, arguing that the 
Government’s proffered race-neutral reasons for striking the juror were pretextual.  The 
District Court denied Appellant’s motions, crediting the Government’s explanation.  
Appellant did not object to the strike as gender-based before the close of venire. 
 On the first day of trial, the District Court raised the issue of the Government’s 
gender-based rationale sua sponte.  The District Court acknowledged that intentional 
discrimination on the basis of gender in the use of peremptory strikes violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, but upheld the strike under Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 
2002), finding that the Government would have struck the juror even in the absence of 
any gender-related reason.  
Appellant was convicted and sentenced following the jury trial. 
II. Analysis 
 Appellant argues that the District Court erred in permitting the Government to 
strike the sole African-American juror based on her race and gender in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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A. Race-based challenge 
  “We review the District Court’s factual determination of whether discriminatory 
intent motivated the government’s peremptory strikes for clear error.”  United States v. 
DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 
388, 394 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1091 (1994)).   
 Under Batson, a court shall employ a three-step procedure for evaluating claims of 
discrimination in the jury selection process:  
“First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory 
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race.  Second, if that showing 
has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking 
the juror in question.  Third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial 
court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful 
discrimination.”  
 
Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 
U.S. 322, 328–29 (2003) (discussing three-step inquiry under Batson)).2   
 As to step two, the record is clear that the Government provided several race-
neutral reasons for striking the juror.  The Government noted that the juror may have had 
a liberal bias based on being a state employee, had only recently moved to the city of the 
trial, and was relatively uneducated.  “[T]he Supreme Court has purposely set a relatively 
low bar at step two . . . . ‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s 
                                                          
 2 Because the Government offered several race-neutral reasons for the strike and 
the District Court proceeded to a full Batson analysis, the issue of whether Appellant 
made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination is moot.  See Johnson v. Love, 40 
F.3d 658, 663–64 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 
(1991)). 
    
 
5 
 
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’” Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 
F.3d 246, 257 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per 
curiam)).  The Government’s asserted reasons are not inherently discriminatory and thus 
satisfy step two.  
 Finally, at step three, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that the Government advanced non-pretextual, race-neutral reasons in support of the 
strike.  In this context, we afford the trial court’s determination considerable deference 
because it depends in large part upon the credibility of the attorney exercising the strike.  
Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 350 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Casper, 
956 F.2d 416, 419 (3d Cir. 1992)).  We will not reverse the trial court’s determination 
“‘unless it is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2002)).  In 
light of the juror’s statements that she was a state employee, typist, and had only recently 
moved to Harrisburg, we cannot say that the District Court clearly erred in determining 
that the Government’s asserted reasons for the strike were not pretextual.  
 Thus, the District Court properly concluded that the peremptory strike was not 
race-based and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  
B. Gender-based challenge 
 Appellant did not raise a contemporaneous Batson objection on the basis of 
gender.  Accordingly, we will review for plain error.  See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. 
Forte, 806 F.2d 73, 75–76 (3d Cir. 1986) (objection must be made contemporaneously or 
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at the close of voir dire in order to preserve Batson claim); United States v. Heron, 721 
F.3d 896, 901–02 (7th Cir. 2013) (race-based Batson objection did not preserve religion-
based Batson claim and plain error applied).  To prevail, Appellant must show that the 
error “is plain, . . . affected his substantial rights, and . . . would seriously affect the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Ward, 
626 F.3d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 203–04 
(3d Cir. 2009)). 
 We have recognized that the strike of a juror motivated in part by an 
impermissible reason—like gender—may nevertheless be valid if the prosecutor 
demonstrates that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible 
motivation. Gattis, 278 F.3d at 234–35.  The District Court specifically found that the 
Government would have struck the potential alternate juror even in the absence of any 
gender-related reason and that the Government’s impermissible gender-based 
consideration was “strictly de minimus.”  App. 128–29.  In light of the Government’s 
proffered gender and race-neutral reasons for the strike, we discern no error in the 
District Court’s determination that the peremptory strike was valid.  
III.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction. 
